Powersharing Agreements: Probably as bad as they initially seem

Here's another interesting article I found through Chris Blattman's blog, this time on Zimbabwe (I swear I'm going to switch to articles from elsewhere soon, I'm just catching up on the week's reading and posting things as I find them). I've always been very skeptical about these kinds of power sharing agreements that are forced upon opposition parties that have a legitimate claim to an actual election victory, but I haven't read any formal studies. Are these compromises better than continued post election violence or will they only lead to even less effective government and therefore make things worse in the future? Can actors resolve their disagreements and work together effectively?

Power sharing certainly works in many European governments (though it is often very unstable as recent events in my native Austria show) but I think it is virtually impossible in a situation like Zimbabwe where the ruling party is willing to try virtually anything to undermine its new 'partner'. The article cites many reasons as to why power sharing wont work but I think the most important is the point below:

Even if a power-sharing arrangement was a viable option and could prevent more violence in the shorter or longer term, it is not necessarily a strategy worth pursuing. Allowing a small number of elites to determine outcomes is inherently undemocratic, and manifestly ignores voters' choices. It would make more sense to hold new elections as soon as possible, preferably under a caretaker government. Otherwise, a terrible precedent is set, encouraging politicians who are not committed to democracy to attempt to steal elections and then, through power-sharing agreements, secure a much stronger position than they otherwise would have held. The Zimbabwean opposition and international actors would be well advised to consider this before supporting further negotiations.